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The people’s peace processes: Local resistance 
processes and the development of ‘zones of peace’ 
in Colombia
Sumario
Zones and Peace Communities in Colombia: resisting pain, building nests and weaving 
life.   NGO’s assistance in helping to crate zones of peace: the case of REDEPAZ “One 
hundred municipalities of peace”.    Mogotes: Peace in spite of all adversities: five-year 
anniversary.    Samaniego: the effectiveness of the power localities in the quest for peace. 
San Pablo: practicing peace in the center of war.   Comparative Analysis Chart.
Resumen
 El objetivo de este artículo es el de exponer el caso de tres municipios Colombianos Mo-
gotes (Santander); Samaniego y San Pablo (Nariño) quienes declararon sus comunidades 
como zonas de paz.  Al ilustrar el proceso, desarrollo, obstáculos y problemas al estable-
cer una zona de paz, el artículo espera desarrollar los siguientes temas: 
1) Resistencia local a la violencia: el desarrollo de la noción de “neutralidad activa”;
2) El proceso de desarme de la “maquinaria de guerra”:  procesos de recuperación de 
espacios de paz. 
La tesis principal de este artículo es que las Zonas de Paz contribuyen al cambio en 
procesos de identidad, específicamente aquellos cambios relacionados con la noción del 
saberse “víctima del conflicto”.  Por ende, las Zonas de Paz aportan al tránsito de una 
perspectiva centrada en la victimización a una noción de empoderamiento en el cual las 
comunidades locales más afectadas por la violencia en Colombia pueden ellas mismas 
contribuir a forjar las condiciones para la resolución y la reconciliación de los conflictos 
en sus propios términos.   
Palabras clave: Zonas de Paz; Colombia; Nariño, Santander, Guerra Civil, Sociedad 
Civil, Procesos Locales de Resistencia, Neutralidad Activa, Comunidades locales de paz, 
Resolución de Conflictos.
Abstract: The objective of this article is to expose the case of three Colombian municipios 
–Mogotes (Santander), Samaniego and San Pablo (Nariño) which declared their commu-
nities as zones of peace. Through the illustration of the process, development, obstacles 
and problems when establishing a peace zone, the article hopes to develop the following 
themes:
1) Local Resistance to violence: the development of the notion of “neutral activity.”
2) The process of disarmament of the “machinery of war”: processes of recovery of spa-
ces of peace.
The main thesis of this article is that Peace Zones contribute to change in the process of 
identity, specifically such changes related to the notion of knowing oneself as “victim of 
the conflict.” Therefore, peace Zones contribute to the transition of a perspective centred 
in the victimization to a notion of empowerment in which the local communities most 
affected by violence in Colombia can themselves contribute to forge the conditions for the 
resolution and the reconciliation of the conflict in its own terms.
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Colombia’s conflict is the oldest armed conflict in the Americas. Nearly 
four-decades of armed confrontations between several armed organiza-
tions, FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), ELN1 (National 
Liberation Army), AUC2 (United Authorities of Colombia) and the Colom-
bian Army.  Currently, all peace efforts from civil society organizations 
are being done in the midst of the confrontation between the major-armed 
actors. Colombia’s state is a fragile one, currently disputing the political 
and territorial sovereignty with a number of violent actors including guer-
rillas, drugs traffickers, self-defense units, paramilitaries, and common 
delinquency.3 Because of this complex association of violent actors, civil-
ians are the most vulnerable populations for the following reasons:
• Government authorities do not protect the life and integrity of its citi-
zens.
• The Colombian territory is partially controlled by armed actors, en-
dangering the life of civilians who currently occupy those areas. 
• Violent factions forcibly recruit civilians, exposing them as ‘targets’ 
for massacres, disappearances, tortures, or murderers.
The effects of the conflict on civilians are immense. In Colombia, since 
1985, nearly 2.9 million of civilians have been forcibly displaced creating 
the biggest humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere4.  Hence, ci-
vilians are both the primary victims and are often “trapped” in the armed 
confrontations. In sum, it is important to arrange empowering processes 
and interventions by which civilians can declare themselves “actively 
neutral” -restraining the access of violent actors within their community, 
if an endurable, sustainable peace is desired for Colombia.  
Additional time and resources should be invested in creating interven-
tions to alleviate the condition of the most vulnerable sector in contem-
porary armed conflicts: civilians.  Trapped in the middle of such con-
The people’s peace processes:
Local resistance processes and the 




3 Notice that each actor can “strategically” combine with each other if needed.  For example, drug 
lords and self-defense units in the northern part of the country; militaries and paramilitaries against 
guerrillas; different guerrilla groups against paramilitaries.
4 CODHES “Desplazamiento,” “El Embrujo Autoritario”.  (Bogotá: Colombian Human Rights Platform 
P, 2003)124. 
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flicts, civilians are often displaced, tortured, 
massacred, and dispossessed of their land. 
Moreover, international law does not provide 
mechanisms for their protection, nor are they 
included as active parties in formal negotia-
tions. One of the most challenging tasks facing 
the Conflict Analysis and Resolution field is 
how to design effective interventions in situa-
tions of internal armed conflicts. 
Colombia’s civil society is quite complex and 
rich in its variety of actors including peasants, 
students, union workers, women, associations 
of relatives of kidnap and disappeared people. 
Likewise, the peace initiatives vary from pres-
suring the national government to start a 
negotiation process; to organizing thousands 
of women marching the streets of Bogotá and 
Putumayo in 2002 and 2003; to supporting lo-
cal resistance processes of peace.  One of the 
many local resistance processes conducted in 
Colombia in the last few years is the ‘One hun-
dred Municipalities of Peace’ conducted by RE-
DEPAZ, the oldest peace network in Colombia. 
The peace umbrella organization REDEPAZ is 
a network of more than 400 organizations dif-
ferent peace efforts that has active presence 
in all the regions of the country, fostering lo-
cal peace processes within the communities. 
In the year 2002, REDEPAZ carried out the 
project ‘One hundred Municipalities of Peace’. 
One of the important aspects of this project 
was the special focus on the most vulnerable 
sector that is currently suffering the conse-
quences of the armed confrontation in remote 
regions of Colombia, often under the control of 
armed actors and historically abandoned and 
unattended by the Colombia State.  
“Mogotes” declared their town a peace ter-
ritory in 1998.  REDEPAZ used the case of 
“Mogotes” as an example of local citizen peace 
initiative that could be reproduced in other 
locations such as municipalities, schools and 
neighborhoods. This is the origin of the proj-
ect “One Hundred Municipalities for Peace” 
funded by the European Union.
The objective of this paper is to illustrate 
the case of three municipalities that are part 
of the above-mentioned project.  Mogotes 
(Santander), Samaniego and San Pablo 
(Nariño) declared their communities a zone 
of peace. By illustrating the process, develop-
ment, obstacles and current challenges of es-
tablishing a zone of peace, I attempt to address 
the following themes:
1) Violence resistance: the process of develop-
ing the notion of ‘active neutrality’5;
2) The process of disarming the ‘war machin-
ery6’ by reacquiring spaces for peace.
The leading proposition of this essay is 
that Zones of Peace are capable of producing 
identity-transformation changes with regards 
to the notion of being ‘victims of the conflict’. 
Thus, the ZOP contributes to the modification 
of a victim-centered perspective towards one of 
resilience in which the local communities fos-
ter conditions for reconciliation and resolution 
of the conflicts in their own terms.  As some of 
the written material about the “One hundred 
Municipalities of Peace” states:
The project is thus based on the no-
tion that unarmed civilians are not only 
victims of armed confrontations but ac-
tors of peace within their own communi-
ties.  Much has been said about the need 
to complement the formal negotiation 
process between the elites of the par-
ties with democratizing, bottom-up pro-
cesses. Zones of Peace such as Mogotes, 
Samaniego and San Pablo are concrete 
examples of citizen, governmental and 
non-profit cooperation to protect the life, 
the land and the dignity of unarmed civil-
ians. 
The field of Conflict Resolution is in need of 
systematizing the local initiatives for peace that 
are taking place in war-torn societies such as 
Philippines, Guatemala, and Colombia.  This 
article is a very small contribution to learn from 
field experiences and hopefully to start delin-
eating a deeper understanding of what makes a 
Zone of Peace (hereafter known as a ZOP) more 
durable and successful in conditions of extreme 
violence.  The study recognizes the bravery of 
those that live under the fear of violence yet 
believe in the power of non-violent resistance, 
even after being threatened and having their 
houses destroyed in several occasions.  
This paper is divided into four sections. 
First, a general depiction of the notions of 
zones (which obeys to geographical boundar-
ies) and communities (corresponding to the 
community as such regardless of their loca-
5 Active Neutrality or Neutralidad Activa is the notion developed by several Colombian NGOs by which they define how social actors 
are: 1) independent from all violent actors; oppose all forms of war and violence; and actively work for the resolution of the c icts. 
6 By ‘war machinery” I mean the geographical ,  psychological and cultural dynamics that fuel and perpetuate conflict and conflict 
behavior. 
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tion) of peace.  Second, an overview of the 
project “One hundred municipalities of peace”. 
Third, an account of the processes of Mogotes, 
San Pablo and Samaniego. Fourth, a compara-
tive analysis based on the above description 
and lastly, general conclusions and guidelines 
for future research. 7
1. Zones and Peace Communities in Colom-
bia: resisting pain, building nests and weav-
ing life
Colombian International Humanitarian 
Rights expert, Alvaro Villarraga argues that 
since 2002, the peace movement manifests in 
three instances:
1) the women’s movement; 2) the indigenous 
resistance as a cultural and territorial move-
ment and, 3) the community resistance 
processes as humanitarian flags.  Those are 
the three bastions, I believe it is the only and 
most important that could let us affirm as a 
fact that there is still a peace movement in 
Colombia, as a real, material fact (Personal 
Interview, October 17th, 2003)8. 
The process of building local resistance 
initiatives by itself is an interesting one as it 
exemplifies how communities can restore their 
social fabric by working on humanitarian goals 
in conditions of high levels of violence.  More-
over, it is happening not only in Colombia, 
but in other conflict-ridden societies such as 
the Philippines, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
9  Even more importantly, some of these local 
resistance processes are being led by women. 
As Magdala Velazquez explains:
The civil resistance done by women 
is very strong here, [...], but Colombia 
doesn’t have the eyes to see it or to value 
it. After Uribe won last year, the humani-
tarian struggle has been led by women, 
I mean the only humanitarian agree-
ments that have been accomplished in 
this country are done by women [...] the 
vanguard of the humanitarian movement 
is in the hands of women (M. Velazquez, 
Personal Interview, October 29th, 2003)10.
 Local resistance processes have been large-
ly ignored by the Colombian society in general 
and by social sciences in particular.  However, 
there is an increasing interest in the topic as 
shows the efforts by several research institutes 
and institutes.  A very relevant example is the 
most recent United Nations “Human Devel-
opment Report” for Colombia. The Colombia 
UNDP report entitled “Colombia: Alley with 
an Exit” was published in October of 200311. 
The team of researchers spent a year and a 
half talking to more than 4000 people all over 
the country.  One of the chapters is called the 
“Data bank on good practices of the ‘Other Co-
lombia’” in which the researchers explore the 
community-oriented processes of restraining 
violence.  It is precisely in the regions that are 
most affected by the incursion of guerrilla or 
paramilitary violence, that resistance and co-
existence practices are becoming the ‘keys’ to 
confront violence and resolve conflicts.  Some 
examples of these local resistance practices in 
Colombia include:
[In order] to protect ethnic reserva-
tions in El Cauca, communities are con-
ducting indigenous ‘guards’; processes of 
civil resistance from armed actors in Mi-
coahumado (Bolívar) achieved that para-
militaries and ELN guerillas respected 
their village; Constitutional assemblies 
in Mogotes (Santander) and Tarso (An-
tioquia) and in some parts of Tolima. [...] 
In the Valle region, land has been given 
to 10,000 Internally Displaced Peoples 
(IDPs), thanks to the humanitarian ac-
cords achieved between armed groups 
and communities.12 
 
The local resistance processes have an intrin-
sic value in itself, as citizens are able to organize 
themselves in “Peace Communities”13. Alvarro 
Villaraga defines peace communities as: 
spaces in which armed actors are not 
allowed to enter, the only protection is 
symbolic, with signs and everything, but 
obviously this is symbolic, and reduces 
the risk of the community as well as dis-
tance them from the violent actors” (Per-
sonal Interview, October 17, 2003).
7 The article was originally written in the year 2000.  However, the author has up-dated the information of the last three years for the 
three zones.
8 Interview done of the Woman Waging Peace research.
9 For more information on “Local Zones of Peace” see the research conducted by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 
at George Mason University. Forthcoming publication. www.gmu.edu/icar
10 For more information on the role of women in the creation of local zones and communities of peace please consult the Women 
Waging Peace forthcoming publication at wwww.womanwagingpeace.net 
11 For a full-length copy of the report go to: United Nations Development Program, Colombia: alley with an exit,  www.pnud.oeg.co/
indh2003   
12  “El banco de buenas prácticas de la ‘Otra Colombia’, El Tiempo. (Bogotá: Dossier, Sunday, October 12th, 2003) p. 17 
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Without the use of arms, entire communi-
ties have prevented the incursion of violent 
actors or partially negotiated with insurgents, 
with some degree of success.  Those local resis-
tance practices are not exempt from failure as 
some of their leaders have been assassinated 
by guerrilla organizations, as happened with 
an indigenous leader in El Cauca.  However, 
in some cases, the peace communities, as in 
Mogotes, Santander, the process has endured 
for some years and has gained national recog-
nition. 
Moreover, these processes help answer the 
question of how civilians who are clearly vic-
timized in a civil war, can transition for victim 
hood to leaders in the reconstruction of their 
communities social fabric.   In other words, 
local resistance efforts, either in the form of 
zones or peace communities, are examples of 
how to effectively transition from pain to resil-
ience as a form of resistance.   
 These local resistance processes support 
the concept that an eventual peace process in 
Colombia has to take into account the regional 
differences for the conflict that manifests itself 
differently depending on the region.  For ex-
ample, in areas where forced displacement has 
occurred, several returnees have established 
peace communities. Such was the case of the 
San Francisco de Asís Community, located in 
the northeastern part of Colombia :
in 1999 [the community] ratified a 
document with a framework for defining 
individual membership to the peace com-
munity. [In the document, the community] 
stipulated what it meant to not provide the 
armed actors with any logistical, strategic 
or tactical assistance to any of the warring 
factions. [the document also stipulated] the 
types of penalties that can occurred within 
the peace community to prevent them from 
happening or to enforce any disciplinary 
modality and security measures that will 
prevent misleading the nature of the peace 
community. 14   
The perspective of the conflict in Colombia 
varies if the person is in the capital, Bogotá, 
or happens to live in an area that is in dispute 
or controlled by armed actors.  The regional 
resistance processes are being organized in 
places like Tolima, Antioquia, Cauca, Bar-
ranca, Urabá, Nariño, Caldas, Atrato among 
others.  In sum, these regional practices are 
de facto questioning the following two as-
sumptions. First, that ‘dialogues’ should only 
be held at the national level and second, that 
negotiations should be exclusively between 
armed actors and the government.  
Following a detailed account of the NGO’s 
REDEPAZ project of “One hundred munici-
palities of peace” as background information 
of how external actors such as NGO’s assist 
in the process of helping communities such as 
Mogotes, San Pablo and Samaniego becoming 
zones of peace.
2. NGO’s assistance in helping to create 
zones of peace: the case of REDEPAZ “One 
hundred municipalities of peace”
As was mentioned before, REDEPAZ developed 
a project called “One Hundred Municipalities 
of Peace in Colombia”15.  The intervention was 
an attempt to “promote, create, and/or con-
solidate one-hundred experiences of citizen 
participation in local decision making process-
es that foster gender equity, peaceful relation-
ships and democracy at the local level”.16   
The project can be briefly summarized as 
a way of conducting civilian resistance by en-
closing communities from the presence and in-
fluence of violent actors without the recourse 
of violence.  However, it consists of a series 
of different approaches that altogether give 
shape to the process of consolidating a peace 
territory.  To start with, there is variety as to 
how the process might take place, either as:
a) an autonomous decision of the inhabitants 
of a municipality; 
b) a decision of the local authorities or,
c)  a process guided by REDEPAZ, or 
d) any possible combination amongst the 
three actors above mentioned. 
13 For more information on “Local Zones of Peace” see the research conducted by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 
at George Mason University. Forthcoming publication. www.gmu.edu/icar
14. Fundación Cultura Democrática, Interior Ministry and UNDP. Peace Communities and humanitarian zones in Urabá and Atrato 
(Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática, 2003) p. 76
15 The information taken is based on official documents that were given to me by Antonio Sanguino , director of the project in 
Bogota, Colombia. Given that is only for official use between the funding agency and the NGO carrying out the project, thus I am not 
able to properly cite the documents. 
16 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.  Grant Application. 
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The project is characterized by a number of 
different strategies including: citizen participa-
tion, pedagogical interventions, public actions, 
information and communication processes 
and organization of local civil society leader-
ships in one hundred municipalities.  Conse-
quently, the project is result of the interaction 
between the following strategies17:
STRATEGIES OF THE PROJECT “100 MU-
NICIPALITIES FOR PEACE”
1) Pedagogical Strategy: 
i) Impact on the educational system; 
ii) Development of a culture of peace and; 
iii) Educative alliances
2) Organizational Strategy: 
i) Political basis 
ii) Peace territories network; 
iii) Peace territories; 
iv) Peace tables; 
v) Educative communities; 
vi) Network of peace builders, and
vii) Possible allies
3) Communicative Strategy: 
i) Defining a communicative strategy, 
ii) Plan of activities and; 
iii) The symbolism of peace
4) Strategy for Social and Political Actions: 
i) Elaboration of a local agenda for peace; 
ii) Process of declaring peace territories and 
municipalities; 
iii) Municipal development plans, 
iv) Social control action and participatory 
mechanisms; 
v) Early warning systems; 
vi) Peace activism against war crimes and 
atrocities
5) Civilian protection strategies: 
i) Humanitarian accords; 
ii) Humanitarian Symbols 
According to the newsletter published by 
REDEPAZ in relation to the project, the gen-
eral objective18 is to:
“foster local participatory efforts of 
peaceful coexistence within local com-
munities in order to contribute to vio-
lence reduction and to strengthen citizen  
participation in public affairs, as a way of  
implementing the “Citizen Peace Mandate 
for Peace, Life and Freedom”19 .
The project is based on the need to build 
and strengthen the ‘civil subjects’ that any 
peace requires.  The intention is to provide 
peace a territorial dimension and implement 
the citizen mandate in the different territories 
and communities, which reaffirm that peace is 
the most important public asset for all Colom-
bians20.  
One of the shortcomings that I see in this 
project, encompassing so many different levels 
of actions and actors, is the difficulty of evalu-
ating success if there is not an explicit descrip-
tion of which level will activities be implement-
ed first.  For instance, the project is not clear 
in delineating the level of importance between 
the pedagogical process and the establishment 
of the peace municipalities, or the creation of 
networks of different sectors of civilians work-
ing for peace.  Therefore, more clarity is need-
ed in the project as to which strategy should be 
considered the most relevant for the success of 
the project, or a systematic explanation of how 
these different strategies work.
The European Union was the main donor of 
the project. It is an 18-month long initiative. 
However, the process of consolidating peace 
territories is much longer. The goal is to be 
able to foster the initial stages of the one hun-
dred peace municipalities in a year and a half. 
It is relevant to know that REDEPAZ supports 
communities that ask for advice, accompani-
ment, or any form of assistance under the pa-
rameters of peaceful coexistence. Hence, RE-
DEPAZ does not arrive at the communities if the 
organization has not been previously invited. 
The three zones of peace that will be de-
scribed shortly are part of the “One hundred 
municipalities for peace” project.  The criterion 
for selecting the cases for the research was 
based on the fact that each of them represents 
an exemplar of three possible procedures to 
undertake the process of becoming a ZOP. 
First, Mogotes is an initiative originally cre-
ated by a cooperation amongst the inhabit-
17 Project “100 Municipalities for Peace” Methodological guide for the construction of the peace territories. See Appendix 1 for a 
complete review.
18 Newsletter of the “One Hundred Municipalities for Peace” project. Year 1. Number 2 Bogota, Colombia, March 2001, p. 5
19 The “Citizen Peace Mandate for Peace, Life and Freedom” was another project directed by REDEPAZ in which almost 10 million 
Colombian citizens voted for a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict and the immediate cessation of hostilities amongst the 
violent actors in October 1997.
20 This particular project works with the definition of zone of peace defined as a territory together with a community committed to 
peace.
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ants of the municipality (bottom-up process) 
that requested the creation of a Constitutional 
Assembly to deal with the ongoing conflicts of 
political corruption and guerrilla participation 
in the internal decisions of the locality.  Sec-
ond, Samaniego obeys to a different dynamic. 
The major (local authority) of Samaniego was 
the one who initially developed the peace dec-
laration.  Lastly,  San Pablo is a peace dec-
laration coming entirely from the population. 
Because of its geographical location (Southern 
Colombia, neighboring Putumayo), San Pablo 
is a case of remarkable importance given that 
the locality is close to the target zone of Plan 
Colombia’s a drug interdiction program.  The 
three municipalities are zones in which the 
guerrilla organizations operate. FARC in the 
case of San Pablo; and ELN in the case of 
Mogotes and Samaniego. In addition, the 
paramilitaries also have an active presence in 
those territories.  The zones are characterized 
as being deprived areas in which little or no 
presence of the state represented by public 
force, education facilities, health services or 
basic infrastructure.
There are a significant number of zones 
of peace in Colombia that are not part of the 
REDEPAZ project21, but this paper is limited 
to the description to the three territories above 
mentioned.  Since the scholarly sources on the 
topic in Colombia are scant, some of the data 
for this paper is based on a series of interviews 
and analysis of different primary sources such 
as newspapers, and archival documents, a 
video and a CD-ROM.   
3. MOGOTES: Peace in spite of all adversi-
ties: five-year anniversary  
Geographic and demographic information
• Department of Santander (Please see Map of 
Colombia)
• Province of Guanentá
• 12,488 inhabitants according to the Colom-
bian Municipalities Federation
• According to the 1985 Census Mogotes had 
11’831 inhabitants, in the census of 1993 
Mogotes had 11,803 inhabitants.
• 2001 Population Estimate:  11,17522 
• 33 kms from San Gil which is two hours by 
car from Santander’s capital city Bucara-
manga
• Other main features:
Presence of FARC/ELN/AUC
The 13 of September 2003 was the fifth-year 
anniversary since the formation of Mogotes 
Constitutional assembly that lead to the 
zone of peace process in the municipality.
 
History of the process in Mogotes: reassur-
ing a public commitment to peace23
The event that triggered the decision of the 
inhabitants of Mogotes to declare their village 
a peace territory was after 150 armed men 
and women of ELN took control of the munici-
pality the 11th of December, 1997.  With the 
intention of judging the major charged with 
corruption.  In that action, three policemen 
and one civilian were killed.  As a response to 
the assassinations and subsequent crisis, the 
communal leaders called for a ‘Municipal Con-
stitutional Assembly24 ’ in which two hundred 
people, some from Mogotes and some from the 
adjunct rural villages formed the assembly. 
Unanimously, the participants requested the 
guerrilla organization to free the major, Dorían 
Rodríguez, and for him to be democratically 
‘judged’ by the citizens. After a popular vote, 
the town decided to discharge the major from 
his duties and called for new elections.  José 
Angel Guadrón was subsequently elected the 
new major intending to implement the gover-
nance program suggested at the Municipal As-
sembly together with the process of municipal 
reform also suggested at the forum.   The ex-
21 For more information on Zones of Peace please consult the ICAR-USIP research project and the UN “Human Development 
Report” both mentioned above.
22 The 2001 Population estimate was obtained by the following way:




Tf = Final Time
Ti= Initial Time
The value for Mogotes population for 2001 is negative due to the decline in the value of R.  Between the periods from 1985 to 19
the population has constantly decreased.    
23 Newsletter of the “One Hundred Municipalities for Peace” project. Year 1. Number 0 Bogota, Colombia, December 2000, p. 8
24 There exists a historical pattern in Colombia, that all attempts of social change are mediated through a constitutional reform. 
political history of XIX until date for more references on this.
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perience of Mogotes is one of citizen participa-
tion for social change and non-violent conflict 
resolution.  In 1999, Mogotes received national 
and worldwide recognition through the Na-
tional Peace Prize.  Diplomats, union leaders, 
non-profit leaders, Catholic Church priests, 
the media, all visited Mogotes.  After a year of 
receiving the award, an event was organized 
by the Municipal Assembly, REDEPAZ and 
the Catholic Offices in Santader to subscribe 
together a “Commitment Letter” with the ob-
jective to strengthen Mogotes’ engagement in 
peace.
The challenges25
As was mentioned before, Mogotes’ experi-
ence was so powerful that it led REDEPAZ 
to replicate this process in one hundred mu-
nicipalities all over the Colombian territory as 
has been described above.  However, as in any 
process that is not based on force or coercion, 
the intent to isolate the community from the 
territorial, political, social and, economic influ-
ence of the violent actors with the use of non-
violence, is subject to the action of external 
violent actors.  Hence, ELN executed the major 
originally charged of corruption. In retaliation, 
the major’s relatives publicly accused one of 
the leaders of the Municipal Assembly and 
the process of political renovation and citi-
zen power started to show ‘signs of fracture’. 
After a while, the process regained force and 
the community began gaining cohesiveness 
after a Catholic father entered a 4-day hunger 
strike offering his life to the process.  The com-
munity requested the violent actors to show 
respect for the process.  The hunger strike was 
stopped when insurgents, paramilitaries and 
REDEPAZ went to the town Mogotes reiterated 
its commitment to peace.  
The people of Mogotes are indeed remark-
able.  For example, they modified the title of 
major to one of manager, thus transforming 
the whole concept of public service, moving 
away from clientele-based politics to more 
efficiency and merits- based way of handling 
public affairs. Periodically he/she has to pres-
ent a public report in the inhabitants in the 
public plaza.  Long question and answers ses-
sions are the ruling dynamics of social change, 
in a town characterized by unemployment and 
minimal presence of the state.   Quoting the 
words of Diana Angel who visited the village: 
“Mogotes is the living example of a small Ath-
ens, in the middle of nowhere in Colombia”.  
Current events in Mogotes : 2002-2003
According to Sara Ramirez, field researcher of 
the ICAR-USIP project, 
Up to this moment [July 2003] 44 
assembly meetings have happened in 
the last five years of the existence of the 
process.  Of all these assemblies, records 
have been kept, and in addition, in order 
to guarantee the good behavior of the 
constituents, a manual was created en-
titled: “The Profile of the Pubic Servant”. 
(Ramirez, Sara, Mogotes, Report, No. 8, 
July, 2003)
Today Mogotes is still under the threat of 
ELN forces.  In addition, a much more deadly 
threat is attempting to enter the zone: the 
paramilitaries. Currently ELN and the para-
militaries are in dispute for controlling the 
surrounding province of García Rovira.  
Despite the pressure from the paramili-
taries, and the previous crisis, Mogotes still 
defines itself as an autonomous peace com-
munity.  As long as the civilians continue their 
support to excluding the use of force and to ac-
cept that any violent actor are dicing over their 
town, a zone of peace survives, because it is 
their way of resisting their condition as victims 
of this conflict.
4. Samaniego: the effectiveness of the pow-
er localities in the quest for peace
Geographic and Demographic Information
• Samaniego is part of the Nariño Depart-
ment (See Map for location of Nariño De-
partment)
• Southwest region of Colombia
• According to the Colombian Municipalities 
Federation the total number of inhabitants 
is 65’380
• According to the 1985 census the total 
number of inhabitants was 43’653
• According to the 1993 the population was 
51’491 
• The population estimate (same method 
25 Interview with Francisco Angulo. See Appendix 3
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as above) shows that R has augmented 
(the opposite as with Mogotes), the total 
is 60’709.  This phenomenon might obey 
to the number of displaced people coming 
from Putumayo.
• Samaniego is 4 hours way from Pasto, Nari-
ño’s capital city.
• The major’s name is Pedro Dorado Galindo 
and he will be in office until 2003.
• Other important features:
Samaniego has reported the negative con-
sequences of aerial fumigations product 
of Plan’s Colombia War Against Drugs. In 
an article from El Espectador (07/25/01) 
Samaniego reported a high school (Colegio 
Agropecuario San Martín de Porres), a na-
tional forest protected area and a fish tank 
as being constantly fumigated by air.
How Samaniego was created a Zone of 
Peace
According to one of the interviewees Francisco 
Angulo26 Samaniego is “a very special case”. In 
his words: “Samaniego is an example that lo-
cal authorities can be committed to peace and 
it breaks the myth that it is only in civil soci-
ety where change lies.  In addition, the most 
important lesson is that it is possible to work 
jointly with local representatives for peace and 
reconciliation”. 
In Samaniego, two processes overlapped 
in 1998: the popular major elections and the 
Citizen Mandate for Peace27. The elected major 
was captured by the ELN. As a reaction, the 
entire town protested, requesting for his im-
mediate release.  After his liberation the major 
committed himself to work for the transparen-
cy of his actions and the implementation of the 
Citizen’s Mandate.  He then invited the citizens 
of Samaniego to participate in the process of 
declaring the village a zone of peace.  Conse-
quently the initiative was entirely welcomed by 
the people and the process of building a peace 
municipality started.  The major contacted RE-
DEPAZ for advice on the process of declaring 
Samaniego a peace territory.  In January 1st 
1998, the process was completed.  However, 
this town is under the direct influence of ELN, 
which monitored the process of elections. 28 
The major assumed one of the programs 
of the Presidents Office for De-mobilization 
and graduated 200 adults in with high-school 
degrees with a minor on “peace coexistence”. 
Moreover, the major authorized the 200 adults 
to have a multiplier effect and trained addi-
tional members of the community.  This ges-
ture was taken as the major’s commitment to 
direct participation process and the commu-
nity showed empathy.
Samaniego has been a ZOP for the past 
three years. The main problem is the situation 
of displaced people coming from Putumayo, as 
a result of the humanitarian crisis, a bi- prod-
uct of Plan Colombia.  Therefore the Nariño 
Peace Table29 sought organizations such as 
REDEPAZ, and the Catholic Church for ad-
vice and support. The people have already 
contacted the governor of Nariño to assure the 
continuity of the process and provide solutions 
to the incoming Internally Displaced People’s 
(IDP) crisis.  In general, one of the big obstacles 
is the total absence of a humanitarian accord 
with the violent actors present in the region. 
Moreover, the people were losing faith in the 
past peace process, between FARC and former 
President Andres Pastrana, given that the con-
tinuation of violent actions kept targeting the 
civilians.
The process of establishing the town as a 
ZOP has been paralleled by the efforts of the 
Peace Table of Samaniego that gathers 25 rep-
resentatives of private and public institutions, 
youth groups, children and all the members 
of the community that want Samaniego to be 
a peace territory.  This process, as was stated 
above, is totally supported by the current ma-
jor, which is convinced of the need of trans-
forming the culture of confrontation and fear. 
Among the different activities contemplated by 
the Samaniego Peace Table are30:
1) The establishment of an information system 
to the vulnerable population of the munici-
pality
26 See Appendix 2.
27 The Citizen mandate for peace was a national process in which citizens voted their willingness to start a negotiated settlement 
solve the conflict by negotiations rather than by military operations, more than 10 million people requested the beginning of peace 
negotiations.
28 In the early 90s the new constitution installed the ‘decentralization process’ which, according to some analysts, is one of the big 
causes of why the guerrilla organization gained so much territorial and political power in the regions.
29 REDEPAZ has regional chapters in different zones of the country. The Nariño peace table gathers the efforts of REDEPAZ in that 
specific region. 
30 This information was extracted from an official document Nariño’s Peace Table (South of Colombia). 
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2) Creation of municipal social policies to im-
provement the situation children, women, 
homeless, seniors, disabled, etc. 
3) Design, creation and implementation of TV, 
radio and publicity intended to shift the 
perception of the communities towards the 
affected population of Samaniego.
4) Networking with institutions that target at-
risk populations in order to jointly imple-
ment and evaluate programs and projects 
envisioned in a coherent social policy for the 
municipality.
Samaniego was, as many municipalities in 
Colombia, a territory in which the insurgents 
use to control the area and the local politicians 
were corrupted.  The people of Samaniego, un-
der the leadership of its major are committed 
to changing the public and private institutions 
so that they can contribute to the peace pro-
cess of the village.
Current events in Samaniego: 2002-2003
Despite the steady increment of paramilitary 
attacks against the population, as well as 
guerrilla retaliations, Samaniego continues to 
be a peace territory.  However, the lack of in-
stitutional support from the current municipal 
administration and the lack of financial assis-
tance from external NGOs like REDEPAZ or the 
local government, have contributed to slow or 
impede the development of the programs that 
were part of the “Samaniego: peace territory” 
program. According to Sara Ramirez in her 
report about Samaniego, “the greatest obstacle 
that “Samaniego Territory of Peace” faced has 
been the lack of continuity of the programs 
by subsequently administrations which let to 
stagnation and the ending of the majority of 
the programs”. (Ramirez, Sara. Samaniego. 
Report No.6, May 2003). 
The other main problems that in turn 
escalate the conflict situation are the drug 
problem, the indiscriminate fumigations and 
the steady number of displaced people arriv-
ing from Putumayo.  However, an interesting 
sector has gained social and political recogni-
tion as they become active members in their 
community.  In the year 2003, the Movement 
for Children for Peace in Samaniego started a 
non-profit organization called “Foundation for 
Children and Youth for Peace”31. The founda-
tion is engaged in a wide range of activities, 
from implementing campaigns of exchange of 
war-like toys to recreational toys, to conduct-
ing peace workshops in the various villages, 
participating in radio talk shows.  In addition, 
they are involved in assisting the displaced 
populations with housing, food and health.
Overall, Samaniego’s peace community sur-
vives amid the following challenges
• The Security Challenge by the incursion 
from AUC and guerrilla; together with drug 
production and trafficking, Financial (hard-
ship in acquisition of funds) and;
• Humanitarian challenge with the in-
flux of displaced people in need that are 
mainly subjected to public assistance and, 
environmental/health ( U.S. lead fumiga-
tions damage the food-crops while poison 
natural resources, also increasing health 
problems to the rural communities) and;
Social actors such as Children, Youth and 
Women start gaining recognition as agents 
of social change, which can influence –in the 
long-term- the current culture of war and vio-
lence as the preferred strategy to deal with cri-
sis, uncertainty and disagreement.  This can 
be accounted as a positive feature.
4. San Pablo: practicing peace in the center 
of war 
Demographic and Geographic Information
• San Pablo is also in the Nariño Department 
(Southern Colombia).  
• According to the Colombian Municipality 
Federation, San Pablo has 25, 089 inhabit-
ants.
• The mayor’s name is Luis Eduardo Lasso, 
until 2003.
• Other interesting features:  San Pablo is a 
coca-cultivated area.  There is presence of 
FARC, ELN and more recently Paramilitar-
ies.
San Pablo’s story
San Pablo represents the complexity of the war 
dynamics in southern Colombia.  Being an ille-
gal crop cultivation area, San Pablo is current-
ly disputed by all the violent actors seeking to 
benefit from the profits of coca and heroine. 
There have been hostilities between FARC and 
31 Information send by Ingrid Cadena on July 10, 2003.  For a detailed account on Samaniego’s Children and Youth Foundation 
please go to “Samaniego, Territorio de Paz?”(2001) REDEPAZ. EU. ESAP.
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ELN and more recently the paramilitaries are 
starting to appear in the scene. In addition, 
the consequences of Plan Colombia are clearly 
seen in this municipality: displaced people 
coming from Putumayo (as in Samaniego) and 
a general escalation of the armed interven-
tions, products of the Plan Colombia’s strat-
egy in the southwestern part of the country. 
Plan Colombia started in 1999.  It is a US aid 
package to Colombia (Plan Colombia)32 mostly 
focused on military assistance.
The recent history of San Pablo33 reveals 
six recent attacks from the insurgent fronts of 
FARC and ELN.  The population decided to de-
clare themselves a peace territory as a means 
of protecting the community from future at-
tacks of any of the violent actors in the con-
flict.  In November 2000 the population pub-
licly declared San Pablo a peace municipality. 
Unfortunately on March 9th 2001, FARC again 
attacked the town.  San Pablo’s citizens, to-
gether with the Nariño Peace Table and RE-
DEPAZ expressed34 to FARC, the government, 
the paramilitaries and everyone else, that they 
are not going to stop the process of being a 
peace territory.  The most important process 
right now is for the community and support-
ing institutions to make it clear to the violent 
actors that they should respect the voluntary 
and popular decision of letting San Pablo be-
come a territory for peace. This process is far 
from easy and San Pablo’s community is not 
very homogeneous for there are civilian sec-
tors that adhere to some of the violent actors. 
There are conflicts between the civilians sup-
porting FARC with those civilians supporting 
ELN. The intra-community divisions increase 
the complexity of the process.  Francisco An-
gulo35 affirmed during the interview that the 
San Pablo’s political context is indeed very 
complex. The population is divided and has 
been influenced by different armed sectors, 
making it difficult to fully develop the notion 
of ‘neutrality’. What has kept the process from 
been totally abandoned is the determination of 
the people to create conditions from protecting 
themselves from the violent actions.  This is 
not an easy step, given the problems of division 
and intra-communal conflicts amongst the in-
habitants.  FARC sees the process of San Pablo 
as a real obstacle towards the power struggle 
for advancing economic, social and political 
power in the municipality.  This is a real threat 
to the community, and, as was stated before, 
San Pablo has been attacked after the peace 
declaration, which means that FARC is really 
not respecting the popular will.
Francisco Angulo made a very important 
statement at the end of the interview, which 
is that 
ZOPs are posing a real obstacle to the vio-
lent actors. Because war is about controlling 
territories, and the Zones of Peace takes those 
territories from the war confrontation.  Hence, 
the violent actors ‘frame’ ZOP as territories 
that they have ‘lost’.  This is why they are a 
clear military target and this explains why 
FARC and ELN insist on hurting civilians.
One of the few strategies of undermining 
this potential threat for all ZOP in Colombia is 
to create enough pressure from different sec-
tors inside and outside the country. Hence, 
any decision to undertake an attack or massa-
cre on a ZOP will signify a high political cost for 
the perpetuators, hence reducing the chances 
for attack.  In this process, the International 
Community plays a relevant role.
Current events in San Pablo: 2002-2003
San Pablo’s levels of violence have steadily in-
creased, even after been declared a Peace ter-
ritory.  As a way of reacting towards the high 
levels of violence REDEPAZ (Nariño) attempted 
to denounce the violent actors at the National 
and International levels.  It was also necessary 
to produce ‘protect’ the leaders working inside 
the communities, given the imminent risk to 
their lives.  Unfortunately, given the high lev-
els of violence the local organizations engaged 
in the process were unable to continue their 
work.  Their leaders were obliged to leave the 
territory in order to survive, practically stop-
ping the activities of the peace territory36. 
In addition, the local leader of the peace 
territory shifted the project of San Pablo be-
ing a peace territory to small economic and 
32 For a detailed analysis look : Rojas, Catalina. “What is the war on (T) ERRORISM ? US foreign policy towards Colombia in the 
post-September 11 world: the end of the peace talks, the beginning of the new-old war” and Reflexion Política”. Journal of the 
Political Studies Institute of UNAB University   (2002) 76-94.
33 Taken from the interview made to Francisco Angulo. See Appendix 2 for more information.
34 See Appendix 4, which is a compilation of support letters from different institutions after San Pablo was attacked by FARC.
35 See interview in Appendix 3
36 Information sent to me from Ingrid Cadena from REDEPAZ –Nariño on June 25, 2003
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productive projects.  Such changes were done 
on behalf of the local leader without consulta-
tion with REDEPAZ, which isolated San Pablo 
from the national peace territories.  By now, 
the remaining community leaders are all gone 
in addition to the local leader of the peace ter-
ritory that also left after being accused of mis-
management.   This is a case in which both in-
ternal and external circumstances contributed 
to the weakening of the process.  San Pablo is 
still plagued with high levels of violence, drug 
production/trafficking problems and the hu-
manitarian crisis of displaced people coming 
from further south.  With the current policies 
of both President Uribe and President Bush 
that tend to escalate a military solution to the 
political violence and the drug problems, San 
Pablo’s situation can get even worse.
5. Comparative Analysis Chart37
 
The following chart is based on the informa-
tion gathered in the various interviews (done in 
May of 2001). Given that the description of the 
development of peace municipalities is com-
pleted in the above sections, what is needed 
at this point is the identification of a series of 
patterns or commonalities that can help us 
understand the conditions under which a ZOP 
tends to last and develop in a more flourishing 
way.  It is also required to discern the main 
obstacles in declaring a peace territory and the 
primary areas that need to be addressed for a 
community to make such a decision. This is 
the purpose of displaying the following charts. 
MINIMAL CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH A ZOP IMPORTANCE OF THIRD
ACTORS
v To demonstrate to Colombia and the 
International Community that ZOP are 
not only the creation of the government-
guerrilla negotiations. Civil Society has 
also struggled to create peace zones.
v The process of understanding that the 
war is not the only way to go about life 
and deal with differences.  
v The procedures vary, what remain 
constant in all cases is that the 
community starts dialoguing with the 
violent actors and set ‘boundaries’ 
through the use of dialogue.
v As far as the communities expressed 
their willingness to stop being victims 
and take non-violent action to restrain 
violence way of dealing with the 
community problems, a ZOP can start.
There is not a single-actor. 
The consolidation of ZOP is the result of the cooperation 




v Peace NGOs such as REDEPAZ, CINEP
v Organized Communities






37 The information used to fill the chart is based entirely on  the interviews. See Appendixes 2 and 3.
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WHAT MAKES A ZOP 
SUSTAINBLE
MAIN CHALLENGES MAIN NEEDS
v The possibility of 
the communities 
to decide their own 
future, the feeling 
of empowerment.  
They have seen for 
years/centuries that 
war is not conducing 
them to better lives. 
Communities see that 
It is time to shift the 
dynamics of life.
v The need for protection 
their lives and land.
EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
v To gain respect from the violent actors.  
v Both insurgent, but more recently the 
paramilitaries have shown very little 
intention of leaving the communities 
away from their confrontation.  
INTERNAL CHALLENGE
v The main challenge is to have a unified 
voice, or at least to be able to install 
mechanisms of dealing with differences, 
other than physical destruction of the 
opponent.
v Communities have to build more trust in 
their process and within themselves.  
SHORT –
TERM NEEDS
v Need for 
training: Even 






The guerrilla announced the attack of the small 
town called Pensilvania.  Suddenly all the in-
habitants of the village appeared in the central 
plaza, all dressed in white carrying peace flags. 
They told the insurgents that it was their deci-
sion if they attacked the town, but the commu-
nity did not approve the action. They made an 
unarmed human frontline and their town was 
protected after the insurgents left.
This is one of the thousands of examples 
that have been developed under the peace mu-
nicipalities.  After centuries of being attacked 
by the state authorities, the insurgency, the 
paramilitaries, the communities started re-
visiting the power of weapons and are shift-
ing towards the use of dialogical processes to 
produce social changes in their surroundings. 
Perhaps they are not totally ready for peace, 
but they are certainly tired of war.  
Many local communities and municipali-
ties are aware that conflict is a natural part 
of everyday life, thus practicing dialogue as a 
preferred mechanism to resolve their differ-
ences.  Even in some cases, local authorities 
are cooperating with the communal initiatives. 
This article is just a small sample of the invis-
ible processes of people building peace in the 
midst of a civil war.  Colombia is at the verge 
of escalating the armed conflict due to the 
continuation of Plan Colombia especially at 
the southwestern areas. 
Endurable peace processes need to start 
at the local level, and what is happening in 
Colombia with the development of zones of 
peace and other local resistance processes, is 
-despite the war escalation process-   a small 
but significant sign of peace building practices 
at the grass-roots level, which will hopefully 
contribute to help sustain an eventual peace 
process in the country. 
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APPENDIX I
GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION


















Research and Advocacy Links
Colombia Support Network




El Tiempo  www.eltiempo.com
El Espectador  www.elespectador.com
Semana  www.semana.com
Movie about Zones of Peace recently pre-
sented in Colombia
Movie title: “San Mateo’s decision”
Contact:  Dario Villamizar
E-mail: darioampc@colnodo.apc.org
www.colnodo.apc.org/villamizar
Phone: 2854347/ Mobile 2932691
Peace NGOs in Colombia currently in-
volved in ZOP processes
REDEPAZ








Dario Villamizar listed above




Colombian professor currently working on 
ZoP. Based in Uppsala, Sweden.
Contact: www.uu.se/department of peace 
and conflict research
The Zones of Peace
Mogotes
Major’s Office Phone Number 977-279-239
Samaniego
Major’s Office Phone Number 927-289-068
Fax 927-289-068
San Pablo 




The following interviews were conducted to 
various members of the “100 Municipalities 
for Peace” project.  Following, the reader will 
find the original interview in Spanish and a 
translated version of the questions. This was a 
semi-structured interview conducted by phone 
from Virginia to Colombia. I was unable to re-
cord the data , hence it is based entirely on 
my notes.  The duration of the phone interview 
was 1 1⁄2 approximately.  Prior to this phone 
interview, Diana Angel in Colombia conducted 
some preliminary questions that I arranged 
for her. The criterion for selecting San Pablo, 
Samaniego and Mogotes was based on the in-
terviewers responses.   
The questions  
1. With your experience in developing ZOP in 
Colombia, could you please describe           
to me a case in which a ZoP has developed ? 
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Are you aware of any ZoP dissolution pro-
cess in Colombia? 
2. Which are the minimum conditions for a 
ZoP to emerge and be sustained for a con-
siderable amount of time? 
3. How relevant is the participation of third 
parties in the process of establishing suc-
cessful ZoP? (e.g. Catholic Church, Peace 
NGO’s such as REDEPAZ) . 
3. Mitchell and Allen Nan defined a ZoP as “an 
attempt to establishing norms to regulate 
the effects of destructive protracted con-
flict”. Based on your experience, do you 
agree with this definition? Which would be 
the basic norms that different actors have 
generated in order to declare themselves a 
territory of peace?  
4.  Let’s talk about Samaniego, how long since 
the major declared it a ZoP?  What are the 
factors that have contributed to the main-
tenance of Samaniego as a ZoP?  Which 
processes can be improved based on the 
Samaniego case?  Apart from the major and 
other local authorities, which other actors 
have participated in the process?
San Pablo seems to be a remarkable case.  De-
spite its recent creation (4 months) and the 
recent guerilla attack soon after being de-
clared the municipality a ZoP, it continues 
defining itself as a ZoP.  In your opinion, 
what are the main reasons that have per-
mitted the continuation of San Pablo as a 
ZoP?  Which are the main obstacles that 
San Pablo is currently facing?  
ENTREVISTA MUNICIPIOS DE PAZ
FECHA : 03/22/01
DIRIGIDA A:  Francisco Angulo Email  
redsur@col2.telecom.com.co
  
CARGO: Coordinador Regional del Proyecto 
“100 Municipios de Paz” de REDEPAZ
ENTREVISTA EFECTUADA POR: Catalina Rojas
1. Con la experiencia que usted ha acumu-
lado trabajando en las zonas de paz en el país, 
me podría decir de un caso en que se haya esta-
blecido una zona de paz y esta haya tenido que 
disolverse y por qué?
Una comunidad es una población que se 
declara territorio de paz; mientras que un ter-
ritorio en un concepto que integra la idea de 
unidad entre el cuerpo, el ser y la tierra. No 
conozco de ningún territorio de paz que haya 
tenido que disolverse.   Todas las acciones por 
la paz, se ven afectadas por un sinnúmero de 
actores de manera casi inevitable.   
El caso de Mogotes
Fue galardonado con el 1er Puesto Nacional 
de Paz, a raíz de la declaratoria de la comuni-
dad como territorio de paz en un acto de sober-
anía popular.  El asesinato por la insurgencia, 
del ex - alcalde que la comunidad revocó por 
corrupción, hizo que el proceso sufriera un 
poco.  Esto debido a que la familia del individuo 
acusó a la gente de Mogotes, desestabilizando 
el proceso.  Como reacción un líder religioso se 
declaró  en huelga de hambre.  Esto evidencia 
la fragilidad de los procesos que no involucran 
el uso de las armas.  Adicionalmente, Mogotes 
hoy está amenazado por los paramilitares, el 
tercer actor. No se conocen los efectos sobre 
la presión ejercida por los paramilitares para 
que Mogotes no continúe su constitución 
como comunidad autónoma de paz.  No se ha 
desmoronado ninguna comunidad de paz sólo 
porque la gente persiste en la construcción 
de la paz, porque es su manera de resistir su 
condición de víctima en este conflicto. 
San Pablo
Es un caso que evidencia la fragilidad de la 
participación de sectores sociales. Adicional-
mente, la sociedad civil en ocasiones participa 
activamente con un actor del conflicto u otro. 
Por ejemplo en San Pablo, el candidato de la 
alcaldía que perdió era simpatizante del ELN, 
y por ello estos están culpando a las FARC. 
Esta es la división política de a sociedad civil. 
El problema tiende a agravarse porque el 
grupo que simpatiza con el ELN y que por con-
siguiente culpa a las FARC, consigue fortalecer 
a los Paramilitares quienes ya ahuyentaron a 
la policía del municipio y amenazan con irse 
definitivamente.  Todo esto debido a los intere-
ses sobre el control de los cultivos ilícitos.  Sin 
embargo, la población civil expresa los deseos 
de continuar con el proceso de consolidarse 
territorio de paz. A pesar de que el pueblo ha 
sido destruido en varias ocasiones, los habi-
tantes han manifestado interés en trabajar 
temas de pedagogía para la paz, especialmente 
con jóvenes y niños. 
En general, no es posible hablar de un 
proyecto fracasado, debido al irrestricto desea 
de la gente por construir. 
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2. ¿Cuáles son las condiciones mínimas 
para que una comunidad de paz surja y se 
mantenga por un tiempo considerablemente 
prolongado? 
Deseo de la población de los habitantes de 
la localidad por cambiar su entorno.  El gran 
problema reside en la falta de capacitación a 
las comunidades, por ejemplo el concepto de 
la Neutralidad.  REDEPAZ no declara las co-
munidades, estos devienen en el deseo de la 
comunidad. El rol de REDEPAZ es pedagógico, 
se manejan los conceptos de DIH, Neutralidad 
Activa.  La falta de capacitación de las comu-
nidades puede llevar a éstas cometan faltas. 
Respecto a los factores que generan la orga-
nización de la sociedad civil, por ejemplo en 
Samaniego (Nariño)  el proceso de declaratoria 
de territorios de paz se dio bajo la iniciativa de 
las autoridades locales.  El caso de Mogotes 
(Santader) es distinto puesto que el proceso 
fue generado por las comunidades. Los prin-
cipales actores de este proceso son: las autori-
dades locales, la sociedad civil organizada y la 
iglesia participativa.  La comunidad tiene que 
entender que esto es un proceso largo, y por 
ende, la seguridad y a la protección de sus ha-
bitantes se da en la medida que se avance.     
3. ¿  Que tan importante es la participación 
de terceros para el éxito de las zonas de paz? 
(Iglesia, REDEPAZ )
El acompañamiento internacional es nec-
esario para romper el miedo de la gente, este 
ha sido negado, y el no gobierno no colabora. 
El rol de terceros se puede dividir en:
• Impulso al dialogo
• Presión para lograr una salida política al 
conflicto
• Incidencia no sólo en la resolución al conflic-
to armado sino también en que los terceros 
sean constructores de paz 
El acompañamiento de la comunidad de 
paz no posee un patrón especifico.  Por ejem-
plo, mientras que Mogotes fue  una inicia-
tiva ciudadana que después tuvo incidencias 
políticas; Samaniego fue una iniciativa de un 
alcalde que fue luego acogida por la comu-
nidad en su conjunto. Sin embargo, lo más 
importante es el apoyo a la sociedad civil lo-
cal.  Ellos solos no pueden.  Poseen muchas 
carencias como la capacitación.  Ellos mismos 
han solicitado invertir en procesos pedagógi-
cos  como el manejo de conceptos tales como 
Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario, Equidad de Género.  Este es el 
rol de una entidad como REDEPAZ.
El acompañamiento internacional tiene 
como rol principal el del servir del garante 
del derecho a la vida.  Nosotros queremos que 
se nos acompañe para que tanto los actores 
como el estado colombiano nos escuche.  Es 
necesario también que el Estado no nos vea 
solos para una más efectiva redistribución de 
los recursos.
4. Hay quienes han definido las zonas de paz 
“un intento de establecer normas para regular 
los efectos destructivos del conflicto violento” 
(Mitchell, Allen Nan) . Basado en su experien-
cia, esta usted de acuerdo con esta definición? 
Cuáles serían las NORMAS BASICAS que han 
generado los distintos actores para declararse 
como Zonas de Paz en el sur del país?   
Hablar de normas en Colombia es hablar de 
impunidad e incumplimiento.  En realidad las 
zonas de paz en Colombia no so una respuesta 
para intentar institucionalizar o normativizar 
el conflicto. La motivación de los civiles, o el 
“primer deseo”  es la defensa de su vida y las de 
sus familias.  Luego aparecen ciertas normas 
de convivencia entre las mismas comunidades, 
posteriormente para los actores armados.  Di-
chas normas se enmarcan dentro del respecto 
por el Derecho Internacional Humanitario. 
Mas que buscar nuevas normas lo que los 
motiva es su PROTECCION.   La norma más 
importante en Colombia es el Derecho Interna-
cional Humanitario, ya que a partir de esta se 
genera resistencia y se desarrollan maneras de 
desarticular  la guerra a través de la acción de 
jóvenes, de niños y de las mujeres.
4. Hablemos de Samaniego, cuanto tiempo hace 
que el alcalde declaró dicho municipio como 
zona de paz? 
     Cuales han sido los factores que han contri-
buido a que Samaniego permanezca    
     como una zona de paz con el apoyo irrestricto 
de la población? 
    ¿Que procesos o factores usted cree pueden 
hacerse mejor, basado en el caso de   
    Samaniego?  
    Aparte del alcalde y las autoridades locales, 
que otros actores o movimientos han    
    participado en el proceso de Samaniego? 
En Samaniego el tanto el Mandato Ciu-
dadano por la Paz como la elección municipal 
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de alcaldes coincidió.  El alcalde elegido fue 
retenido por el ELN.  El pueblo entero pro-
testó en su defensa.  El alcalde a su regreso 
prometió hacer efectivo el Mandato Ciudadano 
por la Paz.  Contactó el alcalde a REDEPAZ 
para asesoría en el proceso de declaratoria del 
territorio de paz. Es así como el 1ero de Enero 
de 1998 , Samaniego es declarado territorio 
de paz.  Este pueblo es de influencia del ELN, 
quien estuvo al tanto de la gestión del alcalde. 
Este, en aras de darle continuidad al proceso 
de declaratoria de paz, asumió el programa 
presidencial para la reinserción en donde 200 
adultos se graduarían del bachillerato con 
énfasis en Convivencia Pacífica.  El alcalde 
dio la aprobación para que estos 200 adultos 
sean reproductores de convivencia pacífica.  El 
pueblo asume esto como un gesto directo de 
participación ciudadana y ha recibido esto de 
manera positiva.   
El proceso de Samaniego lleva ya tres años 
de desarrollo.  El máximo problema que les 
aqueja en estos momentos es la situación con 
los desplazados del Putumayo.  La Mesa de 
Trabajo por la Paz en Nariño busca a otras or-
ganizaciones como REDEPAZ, la Conferencia 
episcopal, y, en solicitud la sociedad le exigió 
que al gobernador de Nariño para que el pro-
ceso la participación  siguiera.  
Uno de los mayores obstáculos es la aus-
encia de un acuerdo humanitario con los 
principales actores del conflicto, entre estos 
las FARC.  La gente ha perdido credibilidad 
en el actual proceso de paz.  L agente necesita 
recuperar la credibilidad a través del cese de 
violaciones a la población civil
6. San Pablo me parece un caso fasci-
nante. A pesar de su corto tiempo de haberse 
establecido (4 meses) y de haber sufrido una 
escalada guerrillera posterior a su declaración, 
sigue definiéndose como un municipio de paz. 
   ¿Cuál cree usted que es la razón principal 
por la que San Pablo siga siendo un  municipio 
de paz? ¿ Cuales son los mayores obstáculos 
para que San Pablo siga siendo un   municipio 
de paz?
 
El contexto político de San Pablo es muy 
complejo.  La población está dividida y es in-
fluenciada por distintos actores del conflicto 
armado, haciendo muy difícil desarrollar la 
noción de neutralidad.  Lo que ha mantenido 
el proceso de San Pablo es la tenacidad de la 
gente para no dejarse matar, para protegerse 
de las acciones de los violentos. Sin embargo, 
dentro de la comunidad no hay consenso y 
esto genera problemas intra- comunales.
En el caso de San Pablo, la insurgencia mira 
a la zona e paz como un obstáculo.  Las FARC 
es consciente que la guerra se gana avanzando 
en el poder económico, político y social.  Y las 
zonas de paz obstaculizan dicho procesos al 
ganar escenarios y territorios para la paz. Por 
ende los actores del conflicto ven a las Zonas 
de Paz como un territorio perdido, de ahí que 
sean blancos de objetivos militares así posean 
su condición de civiles.
APPENDIX 2
Second interview conducted in Colombia by 
Diana Angel with some preliminary questions 
that I arranged with her.  This short interview 
gave me more elements to select the cases. 
This interview was conducted by Diana Angel 
to Antonio Sanguino.
ENTREVISTA A ANTONIO SANGUINO
1. Cuales a su juicio son las principales 
zonas de paz en Colombia?
R/  hay varias experiencias, experiencias, en-
tre esas las experiencias con municipios que han 
incorporado el tema de soberanía popular que in-
volucra a los ciudadanos en el desarrollo munici-
pal, los municipios de paz involucran la gestión 
pública y las autoridades locales en el proceso de 
constitución de los municipios de paz.
Entre los más importantes se encuentran: 
Mogotes (Santander), Tarso (Antioquia), Sa-
maniego (Nariño).
También existen otras experiencias de paz 
como la Comunidades y Territorios de Paz, las 
cuales generan una autonomía de las comuni-
dades frente al conflicto, algunas zonas prin-
cipales son las del Urabá Chocoano, El Urabá 
Antioqueño, la diferencia entre estas comuni-
dades y los municipios, es que éstas muchas 
veces no involucran a las autoridades locales 
ni la gestión pública. Otras comunidades de 
paz son las de los indígenas en Antioquia 
apoyadas por la OIA y en el cauca apoyadas 
por el CRIC.
2. Como cree que sería la mejor forma de 
describir la historia, el desarrollo y funciona-
miento de dichas zonas de paz?
R/ 1. sistematizar las experiencias.
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     2.Acudir a las memorias de los encuen-
tros de estas experiencias y de las secretaria 
técnicas para sistematizar las operaciones, 
reunir lo elementos de valor positivo, lo que 
puede ayudar a visivilizar las experiencias.
3. ¿Quienes fueron los actores claves?
4. R/ hubo una gran diversidad de ac-
tores, en algunos municipios ha jugado un 
papel muy importante la iglesia en particular 
la católica con el trabajo de pastoral social que 
realizan o muchas veces como reacción a actos 
violentos cometidos por algún actor del con-
flicto. Otros actores han sido: las comunidades 
indígenas, movimientos de paz en particular 
REDEPAZ, Acciones sociales comunitarias y 
ONGS de Derechos Humanos y de mujeres 
que se han unido para declarar comunidades 
o municipios de paz según el caso.La creación 
de municipios o de comunidades de paz es 
para demostrarles a la comunidad internacio-
nal que no solo existen territorios de paz crea-
dos por la guerrilla y el gobierno sino también 
la sociedad civil también ha luchado  y partici-
pado para la creación de estos territorios.
5. ¿Donde se consigue mas información 
sobre las zonas de paz?
La información se puede conseguir en RE-
DEPAZ y se tiene como meta crear una pagina 
WEB y un directorio electrónico internacional.
***
